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The paper argues that the concept of trust is inevitably latent in every
contractual relationship, and is best understood as a comprehensive theory
and justification of contract law as both trust and contracts (more than any
other legal action) are aiming toward the same universal goal of cooperation,
risk-taking, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations. Contract law, per se
and through its “good faith” doctrine, could then function as an expressive,
coercive, and thus corrective legal tool, serving to symbolize, build, and
internalize a culture of trust wherever it has failed to develop. Accordingly,
while viewing the corporation as a nexus of contracts and as a voluntary
organization based on cooperation and consent, trust can thus function as an
axis that best fits corporate law, and also serves to justify it.
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Introduction
Trust is the notion underlying the fulfillment of promises and expectations in contract
law. Enforcing the promises implicit in a contract (Restatement, Second, Contracts,
sec. 1),1 and protecting the expectation interest of a promise (Restatement, Second,
Contracts, Sec. 344 [a])2 reflect this understanding.3 The expectation created in the
wake of a promise implicit in the contract, which is usually the highest expression of
trust, is thus the quintessential feature protected by contract law. Moreover, the
voluntary relationships established during the negotiations preceding the contract and
at the time of its signing and implementation constitute the most prevalent form of
social and economic engagement, raising expectations and inviting mutual trust.
Every contract can thus be considered a microcosm that, in its broadest sense,
reinforces the “social” contract and draws on it. Respectively, protecting the value of
trust in the context of contract law conveys the core attitude of the law to the idea of
trust itself. This emphasis, creating a bridge between contract as a legal concept and

1 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 1 (“contract defined”) – “A contract is a promise or a set of

promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy…”; see also C. Fried, Contract as Promise
(Harvard University Press, 1981).
2 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 344 (“Purposes of Remedies”):
“Judicial remedies under the rules stated in [the Restatement of Contracts] serve to protect one or more
of the following interests of a promisee:
1. His ‘expectation interest,’ which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed,
2. His ‘reliance interest,’ which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract not been made, or
3. His ‘restitution interest,’ which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.”
3 For one definition of “trust” see D. Gambetta, ed., Trust [New York, 1988], p. 217 (“Trust (or,
symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses
that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such
action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it
affects his own action…[W]hen we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly
mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to
us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.”). For another
definition and for a recent comprehensive sociological theory of trust see P. Sztompka Trust: A
Sociological Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1999) (“Trust is a bet about the future contingent
actions of others” – at p. 25).
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trust as a social concept, while both aim to reach the same universal goal of
cooperation, risk- taking, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations, is the gist of this
article. This pragmatic insight, including its wider implications, can be applied to
corporate organizations to view them as a nexus of contracts. Could this insight
function as the long-sought missing link in the chain representing descriptive and
prescriptive research in corporate law?
In his recent and original paper, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm,4 Eisenberg brings fresh insights and
examples to demonstrate his contention that the usual conception of the corporation as
a nexus of contracts is, inter alia, “…[u]nsatisfactory as a positive—that is,
descriptive—matter, lacks intellectual coherence, and gives rise to unsatisfactory
implications.” One of Eisenberg’s main arguments against the contractual view of the
corporate organization rests on a view claiming that trust and loyalty between
corporate actors is an ideal goal of corporate law, but a problem prevails regarding the
internalization of these norms in the context of contractual relationships: 5

If all corporate actors fully internalized the social norm of loyalty and gave
full effect to that norm, the costs of both legal sanctions and monitoring-andbonding systems would be unnecessary, and the levels of loyalty would be
much higher than those sanctions and systems can achieve. Accordingly,
whatever the law does do to increase the force of the social norm of loyalty,
and further its internalization, will lead to greater efficiency. Whatever the
law does to diminish the force of the social norm of loyalty, and lessen its

4 24 Iowa J. Corp. L. 819, 835.
5 See also M. A. Eisenberg Corporate Law and Social Norms 99 Columbia L. Rev. (1999) 1253,

1274. This argument is based on B. Chapman’s article Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate
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internalization, will lead to diminished efficiency. Authentic loyalty can run
to an organization, or at least to the group of individuals that inhabit an
organization, but it’s not likely to run to a set of contracts.

Blair & Stout suggest a somewhat similar argument, claiming that contract law
encourages parties to be self-interested, whereas fiduciary law encourages them to be
other-regarding; hence, a relationship cannot be both fiduciary and contractual at the
same time.6
In this article, I support the view that considers “trust” a crucial and efficient
concept in the analysis of social, economic, human, and humane interactions but,
contrary to Eisenberg and to Blair & Stout, I will argue that the concept of trust is
inevitably latent in every contractual relationship, and is best understood as a
comprehensive theory and justification of contract law.7 If so, and rather surprisingly,
the answer to Eisenberg’s concern may be found in the “problem” itself: contract law
as a whole, and particularly its “good faith” doctrine, might be the main and most
direct legal tool (complementing other social methods) for internalizing the social

Fiduciary Obligation 43 Univ. of Toronto L. J. (1993) 547, which also challenged the contractual
model of the corporation based on the concept of trust.
6 M. M. Blair & L. A. Stout Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law
(Georgetown Working Paper No. 241403, August 2000).
7 The claim that the corporation is a set of contracts, and even that “contracts and fiduciary duty lie on
a continuum best understood as using a single, although singularly complex, algorithm”, was already
well established by F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty 36 J. of Law
and Economics (1993) 425, and their article The Corporate Contract 89 Colum. L. Rev. (1989) 1416.
Still, the authors did not adduce that the concepts of fiduciary law, contract law, and corporate law all
share one theory. In that sense, my argument, claiming that the notion of trust provides a
comprehensive theory of contract law, embodied in every contractual setting and helpful in its
understanding, refines the explanation lacking in the model of Easterbrook and Fischel (Compare, R.
Romano Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Contract and Fiduciary Duty’ 36 J. of Law and
Economics (1993) 447). For a view that attacks the “elusive notion of trust” based on its noncalculativeness see O.E. Williamson Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization 36 J. of Law
and Economics (1993) 453, and R. Craswell On the Uses of ‘Trust’: Comment on Williamson,
‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’ 36 J. of Law and Economics (1993) 487.
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norm of loyalty.8 Respectively, in a view of the corporation as a nexus of contracts
and as a voluntary organization based on cooperation and consent, trust can thus
function as a (universal) axis that best fits corporate law, and also serves to justify it.9
Intuitively, trust appears as a crucial, and possibly axiomatic, element in any
human interaction, including the performance of large organizations based on the
cooperation of many constituencies.10 The integration I suggest between corporations,
contracts, and trust, however, still lacks this immediate intuitive resonance. Common
wisdom tends to view legal contracts and even legal regimes in general, as an artificial
substitute ensuring cooperative behavior between people when trust, as a culturalsociological-psychological concept, seems to be missing.11 Yet, this very substitution,
pointing to both trust and contracts (more than any other legal action) as aiming
toward the same universal goal of cooperation, risk-taking, and fulfillment of
reasonable expectations, makes it possible to infer a reciprocity between contract as a
legal concept and trust as a social concept. Contract law, per se and through its “good
faith” doctrine, could then function as an expressive, coercive, and thus corrective
legal tool, serving to symbolize, build, and internalize a culture of trust wherever it
has failed to develop.
Given that contracts are a basic, and probably universal, legal tool, the concept of
trust as a comprehensive theory of contract law (see infra Part I), and the view of the

8 In other words, if corporate law is mainly about norm management, using contract law to substantiate

a culture of trust sounds promising.
9 This claim targets Dworkin’s “super” judge Hercules, which deals with a “theory” that best fits and

justifies most of the formal argument, and “must construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles
that provide a coherent justification for all common law precedents and…. Constitutional and statutory
provisions as well” (R. Dworkin Hard Cases 88 Harv. L. Rev. (1975) 1057, 1094).
10 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny Trust in Large Organizations 87
The American Ecomo,ic Review 333; F. Fukuyama Trust (New York, NY, Free Press,

1995).
11 See, for instance, the quotation by Eisenberg and F. Fukuyama, Id. (Hebrew version at p. 44, 193);

L. E. Ribstein Law v. Trust 81 Boston U. L. Rev 553, 556 (“..[l]aw substitutes for rather than
complements trust”).
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corporation as a nexus of contracts, could function as the missing link in the
descriptive and prescriptive inquiry of corporate law and its dilemmas. Indeed, as a
vast organization, and especially in a multinational and global economy, the
corporation seriously challenges most traditional legal concepts and principles
(including, among others, property law,12 criminal law,13 and constitutional law14).
Contract law, however, is different. As a significant socio-economic organization
involving many constituencies, the corporation supplies clear and strong evidence for
a trust theory of contract law, and can also substantiate an atmosphere of trust rather
than merely benefiting from it. In this sense, the corporation might be described as the
quintessential embodiment of contract.
This article is organized as follows. In Part I, I briefly consider the essential role
of trust. Although trust is discussed in this article as a crucial concept in the corporate
arena, some interdisciplinary insights about the “axiomatic” necessity of trust will be
cited in order to substantiate its systematic and universal role. The major theoretical
claim of the article will then be outlined, namely, that the concept of trust serves as a
comprehensive theory of contract law. Emphasis will also be placed on the “good
faith” principle developed in contract law during the last few decades. Since the claim
is that contract law is justified and also serves as the main legal bridge toward
substantiating the social norm of trust, especially in the modern global economy,
reference will also be made to the recent literature discussing the interaction between
social norms and the law, as well as the internalization of social norms within the law.

12 M. J. Horwitz The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy

(Oxford University Press, 1992), 166
13 This is the case with the attribution of criminal liability to an artificial entity such as the corporation

(see, for example: P.L.Davies Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (Sixth ed., London,
1997) at pp.229-232.
14 D. Meir-Cohen Persons, Organization and the Bill of Rights (1986); Horan Contemporary
Constitutionalism and Legal Relationship between Individuals 25 Int. Comp. L. Q. (1976) 848, 860;
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In Part II, I illustrate the integration of the concept of trust within contract law and
corporate law in some recent decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, which applied
the “good faith” principle (mainly in the corporate context) and used other legal
techniques to substantiate the social norm of trust in the corporate context. Israeli
precedent resorts rather extensively to the “good faith” doctrine of contract law in
corporate contractual settings, explicitly justifying this recourse by reference to the
trust principle, and stressing the implicit obligation of the corporation and its organs
to fulfill the reasonable expectations of all corporate actors. This experience can
provide an interesting point of departure for future research. In other words, this part
will demonstrate the reciprocity between contract law, corporate law, and trust as a
descriptive and prescriptive concept, and the potential uses of contract law as a legal
tool for the internalization of trust, by conveying the goals of contract law and by
using its remedies to entrench cooperation and trust. In Part III, I point out some
preliminary thoughts concerning specific issues in corporate and securities law that
seem best suited for a research project based on the trust theory of contract and
corporate law outlined here. Although the focus of this article is on a relatively
abstract claim, which I hope may prompt a new research direction in corporate law,
some initial discussion will be attempted regarding the applicability of the thesis
presented here to various corporate matters. These matters include issues of
comparative corporate law, the search for an efficient corporate governance structure,
the scope of mandatory rules in corporate law, and legal methods for the protection of
mixed investors within a corporate law model of shareholders supremacy. In addition,
the applicability of trust theory to the area of corporate law can help to crystallize the
justification and content of the disclosure philosophy in securities regulation, and may

Carl J. Mayer Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights 41 Hastings Law
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also supply us with a consistent and predictable application of the doctrine of
“piercing the corporate veil.” Part IV concludes with a discussion about the potential
role of the corporation in generating an environment of universal trust, which is
crucially important in the global economy in general, and within the context of the
virtual Internet world in particular.

I. The Universal Concept of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract Law
and its Internalization as a Social Norm

A. The Universal and “Axiomatic” Role of Trust
Since countries differ greatly on such aspects as their constitutional and legal regimes,
their economic and social institutions, their culture, and so forth, it is only natural to
expect them to vary concerning the legal rules governing corporate issues, including
the structure of corporate ownership.15 Any inquiry into intellectual history, however,
shows that some ideas do seem to bear larger universal significance,16 and this is also
the case concerning the notion of trust.17 Cultural and legal differences
notwithstanding, trust seems to be, socially speaking, an all-pervading, universal
concept (“The importance of trust derives directly from the nature of human beings as
social animals who can only satisfy most of their needs by means of coordinated and

Journal 577.
15 L. A. Bebbchuk and M. J. Roe A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1999).
16 Such as, for instance, the ideals of the French Revolution, or the principles of the “Bill of Rights.”
17As an anecdote and in order to illustrate the broad and yet basic nature of the concept of trust, it
might be interesting to cite the following passage from a swimming-instructions manual: “Asked what
the single most important factor is in learning to swim, most people would reply ‘Confidence.’ A sense
of trust—what we have called being at home in the water—provides the foundation for us to do
whatever else might come naturally in the water”(S. Shaw and A. D’Angour The Art of Swimming:
In a New Direction with the Alexander Technique [Ashgrove Pub., Bath, U.K., 1996] at p. 89).
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cooperative activities”18; “High trust among citizens accounts for the superior
performance of all institutions in a society, including firms”19); economically
speaking (“It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence”20); and psychologically
speaking (Trust is a central ingredient of the “healthy personality”21). More
specifically, and closer to the thesis of this article, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny emphasize the relevance of the concept of trust in the area of
large corporations:

Higher trust between people in a population should be associated with
greater cooperation. These views of trust share an important implication,
namely, that trust should be more essential for ensuring cooperation
between strangers, or people who encounter each other infrequently, than
for supporting cooperation of people who interact frequently and
repeatedly. In the latter situations, such as families or partnerships,
reputations and ample opportunities for future punishment would support
cooperation even with low levels of trust. This implies that trust is most
needed to support cooperation in large organizations, where members
interact with each other only infrequently because they are only rarely
involved in joint production…. In sum, trust enhances economic

18 S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters Social Principles and the Democratic State (London, 1977), at p. 279.
19 F. Fukuyama, Supra note 10.
20 Kenneth J. Arrow Gifts and Exchanges Vol. 1 (No. 4) Philosophy and Public Affairs (1972) 343,

357.
21 Erickson E. H. Identity, Youth, and Crisis, [New York, 1968].
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performance across countries…. Trust promotes cooperation, which is
most important for large organizations.”22

B. The Concept of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract Law
The purpose of this part of the paper is to substantiate the claim that the concept
of trust can serve as a comprehensive theory of contract law.22a Moreover, since most
of our daily actions are based on consent, reciprocity, and cooperation, and are hence
subject to contract law, contract law can be viewed as the most social as well as the
most basic legal foundation.23 A harmonic perspective will then be suggested,
whereby the principle of good faith will also be viewed as drawing its vitality and
contents from the basic justification or overarching theory shedding light on contract
law in general—the notion of trust.24 From this perspective, the principle of good
faith and contract law (and possibly, even law in general) are both construed as
relying on the pivotal concept of trust. This strategy might be helpful in identifying
the principle of good faith as part of a whole, and as a means for attaining trust
whenever eroded in pre-contractual or contractual settings. It may also contribute to
the consistent implementation of contract law by lawyers and courts, including its
whole range of rules and instruments, thus ensuring certainty and stability. Trust also
plays a crucial role in strengthening confidence and reliable expectations, and is a

22 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny Supra note 10.
22a For a different view see: D. Kimel From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of

Contract (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); D. Kimel Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract
21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2001) 473, see pp. 489-493; D. Kimel Remedial Rights and
Substantive Rights in Contract Law 8 Legal Theory (2002)313, see pp. 325-328.; A critique of this
view: Anthony Bellia Jr Promises, Trust, and Contract Law 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence
(2002) 25-40.
23 Sec. 61 to the Israeli Contract Law (Contracts (General Part) 5733-1973) express this notion by
applying the concepts of contract law on every legal action, even if not contractual in its nature. See
also S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, Supra note 18, at p. 279 which describe “… the nature of human
beings as social animals who can only satisfy most of their needs by means of coordinated and
cooperative activities”
24 For concrete examples of this claim, see the next part.
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vital element when individuals consider, before acting, whether to commit themselves
to a move whose results depend on the future performance and cooperation of the
other party. In these circumstances, the availability of the good faith principle as a
complementary corrective standard to which the legal system can resort for
maintaining trust in unforeseen situations is highly desirable.25 The legal system will
thereby promote a culture of trust in the context of contract law that will encourage
ease, increase safety and confidence levels, and improve planning ability at all levels
of interaction and commitment.26
Accordingly, while striving to create and strengthen trust both expressively and
coercively, whether through conventional contract law or through the principle of
good faith,27 we will also see the institutionalization of a stable socio-economic
culture that encourages cooperation. An additional and no less important aim is also
thereby achieved, namely, the flourishing of personal autonomy and mutual respect.
In this article, the close bond between the notions of trust and reasonable
expectations is highlighted. The notion of “trust” is thus upheld as representing the
most adequate comprehensive theory, both descriptive and prescriptive, for the
justification of contract law. First, the notion of trust is already implicit in other
justifications of contract law and, at the very least, justifies their existence. Second,
the voluntary relationships established during the negotiations that precede the
contract and at the time of its signing and implementation constitute the most
prevalent form of social and economic engagement, raising expectations and inviting
mutual trust. Every contract can thus be considered a microcosm that, in its broadest

25 This claim can be used to extract more coherent standards for filling gaps occasionally found in

contracts, based on the trust theory of contract law.
26 Since trust is crucial for shaping and maintaining our social and economic quality of life, striving for

its attainment will, in itself, lead to the stability and certitude so sought after in the legal realm in
general, and in contract law in particular.
27 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 1, 205, Supra notes 1 and 86 (respectively).
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sense, reinforces and draws from the social contract. Respectively, protecting the
value of trust in the context of contract law conveys the core attitude of the law to the
idea of trust itself.
Third, trust is the notion that stands behind the fulfillment of promises and
expectations in contract law.28 Enforcing the promises implicit in a contract, and
protecting the expectation interest29 (particularly through the remedy of “specific
performance,” which is a central remedy in breach of contract) reflect this
understanding. So does the extension of contract law to promises that are essentially
non-commercial.30 The expectation created in the wake of a promise implicit in the
contract, which is usually the highest expression of trust, is thus the quintessential
feature protected by contract law.31
Fourth, the close association between contracts and the notion of trust can also be
inferred from the “interchangeable” nature of the relationships between them. If we
could expect, formulate, and implement detailed contracts that contend with all
situations and developments without transaction costs, trust would be redundant,
whereas in a world where total trust prevails between people, contracts would be
unnecessary. We might therefore conclude that detailed contracts, the recourse to
courts in general, and the frequent use of the good faith principle in particular, do not
necessarily follow from stability, certitude, and trust, but possibly from the absence of
these values, and can thus act directly and potentially to strengthen them.
Fifth, a contract is, by definition, a meeting of wills integrating, as it were, the
intentions of two or more parties. This understanding is relevant to laws regulating the

28 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 1, Supra note 1..
29 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 344(a), Supra note 2.
30 As is the case in Israel, for instance, concerning promises involving surrogate mothers and political

coalition agreements.
31 C. Fried, Supra note 1.
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formation of contracts through the mechanics of “offer” and “acceptance,” as well as
to laws concerning the interpretation of contracts, which are meant to expose the
parties’ intentions and their shared aims. Essentially, the contract is a mutual desire
for exchange and cooperation and, as such, creates mutual relationships of power and
subordination that, in turn, the law recognizes as reflecting fiduciary relations.32
Finally, the view of trust as the comprehensive theory of contract law may serve
as a consistent explanation for the existence of consumer legislation in contract law,
which is generally perceived as compulsory legislation. The increasing might of
economic bodies and their alienation from clients more deprived than them
concerning access to information and economic resources explain the need for
intervention, given that contracting in these areas could also lead to abuses. The
principle of “let the buyer beware” is thus exchanged for one where the risk is
assumed by the seller, for the sake of preserving trust and fulfilling expectations in
contractual situations characterized by high incentives to breach them.

C. The “Expressive” and “Coercive” Functions of Contract Law As a Bridge toward
Trust as a Social Convention
“Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a
particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his
capacity over to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own
action.33 Hence, the origin (or destination) of trust belongs in the psychological

32 Compare: T. Frankel Fiduciary Law 71 Calif. L. Rev. (1983) 795.
33 D. Gambetta, Supra note 3 ” [emphasis added].
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perception of expectation and confidence.34 Such a perception, however, is inevitably
affected by, and contingent on, external circumstances and cooperative behavior. The
perspective of trust is twofold, and includes subjective and objective dimensions.
Subjectively, trust is a psychological concern that is crucial for the “healthy
personality”,35 but objectively, trust is socially and economically valuable in
promoting cooperation and risk-taking.36 This twofold perspective of the notion of
trust raises a question concerning methods for internalizing trust within the law. In
sum, since “trust” is unquestionably a social norm37 as well as a psychological
perception, the main dilemma is whether the law can authentically substantiate (“the
‘complement’ function of law”) this duality.38 My response is that contract law is the
legal domain most deeply anchored in trust and can thus serve, expressively and
coercively,39 as a bridge toward an atmosphere of trust, at least as a social
convention.40 On these grounds, and given that social norms penetrate everyday life
and are revealed as meaningful to legal analysis for a variety of reasons,41 a
discussion about definitions and explanations is in place at this point. The discussion
will focus on the potential influence of law on social norms and will also be a preface

34 As noted, Erikson considered trust “[a] central ingredient of the ‘healthy personality’” (Supra note

21).
35 Erickson,Ibid .
36 In a sense, trust is a unique social norm that, unlike other social norms that we expect to find in a

given society, trust concerns the psychological perception of expectation itself.
37 Melvin A. Eisenberg Supra note 5 (Eisenberg uses the term “social norm of loyalty”).
38 A different view appears to be current now, namely, that the law affects trust artificially (the

“substitute” function of law), see L. E. Ribstein Supra note 11 and the text to notes 4-6.
39 For an attitude that views contract law as a coercive device see Eric A. Posner Law and Social

Norms (Harvard University Press, 2000) at p. 160: “The purpose of contract law is to enable parties to
have the government penalize both if they have a dispute; and contract doctrines merely give parties a
reliable way to indicate ex ante their desire for such government involvement, and to limit the size and
the variance of the penalty to something close to what should be sufficient: a finger rather than a head”.
40 Compare: C. Marks & L. Mnookin, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior” 11 Journal of Legal Studies (1982).
41 For detailed arguments see: Richard H. Mcadams The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338.
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to Part II, which illustrates how Israeli contract law has incorporated the social norm
of trust both expressively and coercively.
The term “social norm” can be understood in several ways. For the purpose of
this article, the simplest definition is the most appropriate: a social norm is a social
attitude of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought and what ought not to be
done.42 Yet, a critical question remains open: what are the interrelations between law
and social norms in general, and between contract law and trust in particular?
Robert Cooter argues that effective laws must align with the morality already
internalized by citizens.43 While Cooter holds that costs are typically more responsive
than internalized values to law and public policy, he also holds that the state affects
the values internalized by the citizens. Once citizens respect the law, they habitually
obey it in their daily lives without reflecting on it. Thus, a just state achieves stability
by generating its own support among reflective citizens. In other words, according to
Cooter’s theory, citizens are more willing to do their civic duty because the state
changes this duty in a way that increases its moral appeal. If that is so, and if we
accept Erickson’s psychological theory about the significance of trust as a basic
component of human personality,44 we must conclude that the law plays an important
role in encouraging the promotion of trust.
Another question that concerns Cooter touches on the ways that are available to
the law in order to bring citizens to internalize values. According to Cooter, just as
states must reward citizens in order to promote the internalization of civic virtue, the
state must also infer character from behavior. The problem is that, due to its size, the

42 Cass R. Sunstein Social Norms and Social Roles 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903.

43Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens ? An Economic Analysis of Internalizing Legal
Values (U.C. Berkeley Law and Economics, working paper series, working paper 2000 – 8) (published
in 86 Virginia L. Rev. 1577).
44 Supra note 21.
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modern state is restricted in its ability to identify virtuous citizens. Inferring character
from behavior requires intimate knowledge of the person, but officials in large states
are far removed from most citizens, and the character of each citizen is thus relatively
opaque to state officials. Consequently, officials lack the information needed to
reward people for acquiring civic virtue, and instead of rewarding or punishing
character, state law mostly rewards or punishes acts. According to Cooter, the state
can rely on families, friends and colleagues in order to reward civic acts. Compared to
the state, people involved in intimate relationships are relatively good at inferring
character from behavior. Consequently, the primary influences on character are
intimate relationships, and states should therefore refrain from attempting to instill
civic virtue directly, instead prompting family, friends, and colleagues to do so.
Insofar as their families, friends, and colleagues prefer relationships with civicminded people, individuals have an incentive to cultivate civic virtue. Civic acts can
thus become signs of the possession of the moral traits that people tend to seek in
partners in cooperative ventures. To achieve this goal, the state must first align law
with the social norms that facilitate private cooperation. This point is important for
our discussion: if we consider contracts are “intimate” relationships, and if we view
the corporation as a microcosm of a social community and as a system of intimate
relationships depending on private cooperation, then Cooter might support the view
that contracts and corporations can be an efficient and intimate tool for promoting the
internalization of a culture of trust.
Elsewhere, Cooter attempts to lay the foundation for an economic theory of
“expressive” law.45 According to the expressive theory of law, the expression of

45Robert Cooter Expressive Law and Economics 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 ( 1998 )
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social values is an important or, possibly, the most important function of the courts.46
For Cooter, the law can create a focal point by expressing values, which could tilt the
system toward a new equilibrium, and creating focal points is the first expressive use
of law. In addition, the law can change the individual values of rational people.
Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological
penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment
conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences.
By creating opportunities for pareto self-improvement, the law induces rational people
to change their preferences. Cooter analyzes how the law can tilt aggregate behavior
and change individual preferences by expressing values. Changing individual values
is the second expressive use of law.
Cooter points to several ways in which the law can change preferences such as,
for instance, using the coercive sanctions attached to acts. Concerning the present
argument, Cooter shows how contract law creates opportunities for pareto selfimprovement. Cooter’s example is highly relevant to the claim of this article, since
both assume an interaction between contract law as a legal device and cooperation as
a social concept. Cooter’s argument proceeds as follows: assume that the state
chooses whether or not to enforce contracts, and the actor chooses whether to be
honest or dishonest. According to economic analysis, social sanctions for dishonesty
are not very effective regarding the promises under consideration; consequently, given
that there are only social sanctions and no legal sanctions, the immediate benefit from
dishonesty outweighs the future cost. The gain from dishonesty largely offsets the
modest social sanction so that, in the absence of contract law, dishonesty is more
profitable. People have difficulty cooperating with each other without enforceable

46 See Cass R. Sunstein Symposium: Law, Economics, & Norms : On the Expressive Function of Law
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contracts, resulting in relatively low productivity; in contrast, when bound by
enforceable contracts people are more cooperative, resulting in relatively high
productivity. Both honest and dishonest people, then, enjoy a larger payoff with
contract law than without it. With contract law, the sanction for dishonesty is social as
well as legal and legal sanctions for dishonesty are effective concerning the promises
under consideration so that, overall, honesty yields a higher payoff than dishonesty.
The dishonest person prefers the high present payoff and the low future payoff
resulting from dishonest behavior, rather than the low present payoff and the high
future payoff from honest behavior, while the honest person prefers the opposite. In
the absence of contract law, pareto self-improvement is impossible, so that a dishonest
person and an honest person prefer to remain as they are rather than change their
preferences. The main point, however, is that contract law produces a different result.
State sanctions make dishonesty less attractive. Contract law creates a situation in
which a person who shifts from being dishonest to being honest is better off relative to
his initial and final preferences. Thus, contract law creates the opportunity for pareto
self-improvement, where none had existed without contract law. In general, the law
prompts improvement in character wherever a legal sanction creates an opportunity
for pareto self-improvement. Adding to Cooter’s model the possibility of legal
liability, monetary sanctions, and stigma through the “good faith” principle in cases of
trust breaching, can make his claim even more convincing, especially when accepting
the internalization theory of Richard Mcadams’ “esteem model.”47

144 U.Pa. L. Rev . 2021 and infra text to notes 50-51.
47 Mcadams identifies the desire of individuals for respect or prestige, that is, for the relative esteem of
others, as an initial force behind norm creation. See Richard H. Mcadams Supra note 41. For the
sanction of shaming in the corporate context, see D. A. Skeel Shaming in Corporate Law (Forthcoming
in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2001).
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Lisa Bernstein cites the diamond industry as a unique example of the preference
of contractual relations.48 As she shows, the diamond industry has systematically
rejected state-created law. In its place, the sophisticated traders who dominate the
industry have developed an internal, elaborate set of rules, complete with distinctive
institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes between members of the industry.
Bernstein’s research is largely devoted to explaining why the diamond industry has
for so long relied on extra-legal enforcement for its business norms. By a variety of
reputational bonds, customary business practices, and arbitration proceedings, the
diamond industry has developed a set of rules and institutions that its participants find
clearly superior to the legal system. This industry, as traditionally organized, has been
able to make its own rules and, more importantly, enforce them. The market is
organized to promote low cost and rapid dissemination of information about
reputation. This enables it to use reputation bonds to create intra-industry norms that
function as a deterrent to breach of contract, and a private sanctioning system whose
judgments can be fully enforced, almost invariably, outside the legal system. As
Bernstein suggests, mores and institutions in the diamond industry developed for
reasons wholly unrelated to shortcomings in the legal system; yet, even as the force of
the old enforcement mechanisms of religion and secondary social bonds began to
disintegrate, a network of trading clubs designed to promote the dissemination of
information about reputation and socialization among members emerged to fill the
gap. The fact that generations of diamond dealers have clung to nearly identical intraindustry norms in countries with a wide variety of legal rules and institutions suggests
that the traditional rules and institutions are likely to be efficient from the perspective
of market insiders.

48Lisa Bernstein Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
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Though unique to a specific community, Bernstein’s model can inform the
argument of this article. A general perception of corporations as small and
sophisticated microcosms, possessing their own institutions and their own
mechanisms for character-forging and enforcement, could emphasize the potential of
such intimate communities to affect human behavior and culture.49 Just as the concept
of trust prevails, through voluntary and contractual arrangements, in an environment
as materialistic and business-oriented as the diamonds’ industry, we could infer its
applicability,

through

contractual

mechanisms,

to

other organizations

and

communities.
Finally, and as noted, the literature extensively concerned with social norms
concentrates on the expressive function of law, “the function of law in making
statements,” as opposed to controlling behavior directly.50 Given that the expressive
(beside the “coercive”) function of contract and corporate law in promoting trust is
well identified in Israeli Supreme Court opinions (infra, Part II), some remarks in this
regard are in place here.
Cass Sunstein emphasizes that, in general, actions are expressive because they
carry meanings.51 As is true for nearly all our activities, from the most mundane and
up to the most significant, this is also true of the law. Sunstein suggests that the
expressive function of the law is closely related to the effects of the law on prevailing
social norms, given the rough analogy between the social and legal levels. He claims

Industry 21 J. Legal Stud 115 ( 1992 ).
49 [The role of compliance Programs/code of ethics - September 2001 – returning to the compliance
area, the Sentencing Commission announces that it is considering refinements in the Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines’ compliance provisions. Looking back, the Commission notes that the
“guidelines have had a tremendous impact on the implementation of compliance and business ethics
programs over the past then years. [They] prompted a serious reconsideration within the American
business community of methods and rationale for improved corporate governance” J.M .Kaplan, “The
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Ten Years” Ethikos, Novemvber/December 2001…]
50 Cass R. Sunstein Supra note 46.
51 Ibid.
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that a society might identify the norms to which it is committed and insist on those
norms via the law. Accordingly, one of the clearest expressive functions of the
“statement” made by the law may be to affect social norms and, thereby, ultimately
affect both judgments and behavior: a law that is appropriately framed may influence
social norms and thrust them in the right direction.
In sum, the literature identifies a largely reciprocal relationship between law and
social norms. Arguably, the most important aspect of the relationship between norms
and the law is the law’s ability to shape norms. Strong and convincing arguments are
advanced about expressive and coercive ways through which the law can shape social
norms, and about the voluntary establishment of commercial communities
characterized by a high level of trust implemented through the contractual
mechanism.52 As far as contract law, corporate law, and trust are concerned, I claim
that trust serves as a comprehensive theory of contract law and as a highly influential
factor in the area of corporate law. The “expressive” and “coercive” opinions of the
Israeli Supreme Court provide a good illustration of this claim, and this is the topic of
Part III.

III. The Integration Between Trust, Contract Law, and Corporate Law:
The Israeli Experience
This part will illustrate developments in the Israeli reality of corporate and securities
law, as they are affected by the trust principle in general and by contract law in

52 In a recent article, Bernstein illustrates the complimentarity between trust and contract, and how

they have also lead to cooperation also in the cotton industry: L. Bernstein Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions 99 Michigan Law
Review (2001) 1724.
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particular.53 A review of some decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court pointing to the
reciprocity between corporations, contract law, and trust could prompt research into
methods based on concepts of contract law potentially useful for internalizing
(expressively and coercively) a culture of trust in the corporate arena.

53 Since this article concentrates on contract law, the illustrations discussed in this part deliberately

overlook classic corporate cases, insofar as they are grounded on classic corporate fiduciary duties.
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A. The Application of the “Good Faith” Principle in Contract Law
in the Context of Corporations
One of the most useful doctrines of contract law, which is used to emphasize the trust
relations created by contractors, is the concept of “good faith” during the negotiation
process (which applies to everyone involved, even if not intended to be a party to the
contract and even if contract was not achieved at the end) and during the contract’s
performance.54 This concept is also well established in the American legal system.55
The Israeli Supreme Court has used this principle to induce people to fulfill the
reasonable expectations of their counterparts by instituting, for example, requirements
of disclosure and other forms of cooperative behavior. Sanctions for breaching this
obligation usually include monetary compensation and

involve a stigma, which

induces people to obey this duty ex ante and, hopefully, helps them to internalize this
norm. These opinions are usually accompanied by explicit normative statements about
the inherent trust relations created by contractual and pre-contractual relations, and
the significance and benefit inherent in the concept of trust:

54 Sections 12 and 39 in the Israeli Contract Law (Contracts (General Part) 5733-1973), deals with

negotiation and performance in good faith:
Sec. 12 - “(a) In negotiating a contract, a person shall act in customary manner and in good faith.
(b) A party who does not act in customary manner and in good faith shall be liable to pay
compensation to the other party for the damage caused to him in consequence of the
negotiations or of the conclusion of the contract, and the provisions of section 10, 13 and 14
of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law 5731-1970 shall apply, mutatis
mutandis.”
Sec. 39 – “An obligation or right arising out of a contract shall be fulfilled or exercised in customary
manner and in good faith”. On the rationale of these two sections, the Supreme Court said (in C.A.
207/79 Beit Yules Ltd. V. Raviv Ltd. P.D. 37 (1) 533, 543:
“This instruction (in section 12 of the Israeli Contract Law), imposes special ‘relationships of trust’ on
the participants in the contractual negotiations, thus expanding contractual trust, originating in Section
39 of the Israeli Contract Law, toward the pre-contractual stage. The obligation to conduct negotiations
in the accepted way and in good faith means that the participants in the negotiation must behave
honestly and fairly toward each other. They are no longer “strangers” to one another; rather, the law
creates a “closeness” between them leading to expectations , and imposes a duty of consideration.”
55 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 205, Sec. 1-203 to the Uniform Commercial Code.
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1. Eximin S.A. (a Belgian Corp.) v. Textile ve-Hanhala Itel Stile Ferrari Ltd.56

In this trailblazing decision, bearing on a contractual conflict between two
corporations, former Chief Justice Shamgar applied the good faith principle and
formulated the doctrine of “contributory fault” as part of the law of contract so as to
encourage a culture of cooperation between contractors. In order to induce this
practice, Chief Justice Shamgar made the respondent legally liable to disclose and
cooperate ex ante in order to prevent the damage that eventually occurred. The facts
were quite simple: the appellant, a Belgian corporation, bought jeans boots from the
respondent, an Israeli corporation, in order to market them in the US. The respondent
manufactured and sent the goods to the US, where they could not be marketed
because the boots’ name involved a breach of a trademark. The appellant suffered
monetary damages and sued the respondent. The legal question was how to allocate
the contractual risk for the breach of the trademark, and whether the contractual
responsibility needs to be an absolute responsibility. Chief Justice Shamgar’s
expressive rhetoric about the economic benefit of cooperative behavior and its
harmony with contractual interaction is worth citing:

Is achieving the aims of the law dependent on the existence of absolute
responsibility? The opposite is true. As in any contract or negotiation, the
basis of the sales deal is the parties’ wish to cooperate, obviously assuming
that cooperation will benefit both of them, separately and together. There is
no reason to assume that this cooperation will end with the signing of the
contract,… but it is plausible that, along their shared path, the parties will
face problems that might require a certain level of flexibility and even a

56 C.A. 3912/90, P.D. 47 (4) 64.
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departure from what was determined a priori. Cooperation will
unquestionably also be required in the future. One aspect of this cooperation
is the understanding that damages might be caused to one of the parties due
to a lack of good faith displayed by both parties. In such a case,
“cooperation” will be manifest in a division of responsibility for the
damages between the two parties, a division that, a posteriori, will actually
encourage cooperation a priori.
(Ibid., p. 81)

Elsewhere in the decision, Chief Justice Shamgar emphasized the direct link
between the good faith principle in contract law and the principle of trust:

The concept of trust and the concept of legal good faith appear to be closely
related. Both concepts share an identical foundation: at the basis of the
sociological concept of trust is the possibility of every individual to assume
that his plausible expectations from the other or from an institution will be
fulfilled, and that the latter will behave according to what is required by their
situation or their role. At the basis of the concept of good faith is the
possibility of every individual to assume that his plausible expectations from
the legal relationship in which he is involved with the other will be fulfilled…
(Ibid., p. 83)

Since this dispute involved Israeli and foreign corporations, we may easily infer that,
in an era of global trade and economy, the application of such a contractual principle
can also give impetus to a universal culture of trust.
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2. Penidar, a Corporation for Investment, Development, and Building Ltd. v. Castro57
This well-known Israeli Supreme Court decision held that a corporate organ is
personally liable for any inactive misrepresentation it made during a contractual
negotiation with a corporate customer. This decision, considered so important that it
was followed by a rare legal proceeding involving a further hearing before an
enlarged panel of judges, also relied on the “good faith” principle in contract law.
Former Chief Justice Shamgar, joined by present Chief Justice Barak, upheld this
decision, which deviates from the classic limited liability principle of corporate law,
and expanded the responsibilities of the corporate manager toward corporate
constituencies (the corporate customer) other than shareholders. The main explicit
reason for the court’s decision was the personal responsibility of every human being
as a social character—even if he/she a corporate organ and even if he/she is not
intended to be a formal side of the contract he is negotiating for—to obey and
substantiate an atmosphere of trust that was developed and expected in the course of
the contractual negotiation process:

The basis of section 12 in the [Israeli] Contract Law is the relationship of
trust that must prevail between parties involved in negotiations
conducted with the aim of signing a contract. Contractual trust is thereby
expanded, based on section 39 of the [Israeli] Contract Law, to cover the
pre-contractual stage.58

And elsewhere:

57 (Additional Hearing) 7/81, P.D. 37 (4) 673.
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This step creates a proper dogmatic infrastructure for responsibility
according to Section 12 of the law. It expresses a legal policy
determining a level of behavior that is based on trust and fairness,
incumbent on everyone engaged in actual negotiations toward the
making of a contract, whatever his function.59

3. Tefahot, Mortgage Bank Ltd. v. Sabach60 and Eliahu Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Yashar61
Some of the most important and frequently cited Israeli legal decisions that applied
the “good faith” principle have involved major corporations, such as banks and
insurance companies.62 These decisions imposed on the corporations heavy disclosure
burdens toward their customers and, again, were explicitly justified through the
concept of trust.
In the case of Tefahot, Mortgage Bank Ltd. v. Sabach, the court dealt with the
question of whether the bank had a duty to disclose to its clients, who had borrowed
money from the bank for the purpose of buying houses built by a company that was
also one of the bank’s big debtors, that the bank knew about the building company’s
financial problems. When the building company could not perform its obligations, one
of the bank’s clients sued the bank claiming that the bank had breached its duty to
disclose the problems affecting the building company. Accordingly, the client asked
to waive his duty to return the loan to the bank. The court was aware that the
disclosure duty owed to one customer involved facts about the financial circumstances

58 C.A. 230/80, P.D. 35 (2) 713, 724.
59 Ibid., at p. 703.
60 P.D. 48 (2) 573.
61 P.D. 49 (2) 749
62 Most of these decisions were issued by former Chief Justice Shamgar.
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of another customer, but emphasized the socio-economic significance of banks, and
the trust and expectations the public places in them. Respectively, the court attributed
a “role of trust” to the bank and read the bank’s disclosure duty into its good faith
obligation, in the name of trust:

The prevalent approach is that the duty of disclosure exists as a matter of
routine between parties about to enter a contract, even without a special
relationship of trust between them but by virtue of the trust created between
the parties to a negotiation… The bank has a duty of disclosure to its clients
about essential details by virtue of the duties of trust imposed on it, even
beyond the obligations incumbent on parties to a regular contract. Yet, as the
scope and level of the duties of trust differ from case to case and from
service to service, so does the scope and level of the duty of disclosure.
(Ibid., pp. 596-597)

Another case concerned an insurance company that had promised a client, before
sending him the written contract, that the terms of insurance for his trucks would be
identical to those stipulated in a former insurance policy issued by another company
(Eliahu, Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Yashar). After the client’s trucks were stolen, the
insurance company claimed that the specific security device required in the written
insurance policy was not the one that the client had installed in his trucks and,
therefore, he was not insured. Chief-Justice Shamgar described the client as a “simple,
unsophisticated man, a laborer who trusts his fellows,” and stated that the insurance
company has a duty to issue explicitly warnings and disclose facts that might affect
the reasonable expectations of its contractual partners:
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The relationships created between the insuring company and the client
should not be seen as the usual contractual relationships created through
sales deals. A basic difference prevails between these two situations: in the
latter, very broad discretion is ascribed to the parties’ will and, when
estimating their wishes at the time of their meeting, we consider them
equals…. This is not the case when at stake is the contract between an
insurance company and a client…. Not only are the parties required to be
more open than in other types of contract, but we are also strict with them
concerning preciseness and meticulousness in the formulation and,
obviously, in the implementation of agreements…. Our system has adopted
and developed a principle of mutual openness even prior to the anchoring of
the doctrine of good faith in civil legislation…. The legislative innovation in
sections 12 and 39 of the [Israeli] Contracts Law paved the way, concerning
our issue, for shifting from the realm of passive sincerity and openness to the
imposition of operative liabilities…. In sum, an insurance company trying to
limit the scope of its liability must ensure that the client is indeed aware of
these limitations.
(Ibid., p. 764)
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B. The “Public-Private” Distinction in Contract Law in the Context of Corporations
The tendency to use contract law to internalize social norms in general, at least
expressively, became evident in Israeli law in recent contract law cases, which
imported social values and “public” norms into “private” interactions.63 What is
interesting is that this social and public viewpoint was also incorporated into the realm
of the classic private law of contracts, mainly when corporate contractors were
involved. In other words, the court recognized the semi-public orientation of giant
corporations and their significance as social agents that affect the business culture and
social culture of the society.64 Although this legal tendency is not unique to the social
norm of trust, yet it shows how the Israeli Supreme Court uses contract law and
corporate actors as instruments serving to internalize social values and concepts.

C. Corporate Charter as a Form Contract
Another interesting case recently discussed in the Israeli Supreme Court (by an
expanded seven judges panel) decided that the charter of a specific cooperative
corporation should be classified as a “form contract,” and ruled it should be
exposed to wide legal scrutiny.65 The “form contract” category indicates that
relationships with consumers failed to involve negotiations. Obviously, once a
charter is placed in this category, it is easier for the court to intervene and revoke
sections of the organization’s bylaws considered one-sided. As noted, although
consumer law is sometimes mandatory, it can be justified and interpreted as part

63 Such as the Basic Laws: Freedom of Occupation, and Human Dignity and Freedom. See, for

instance, C. A. 294/91 Kadisha Co. v. Kestenbaum P.D. 46 (2) 464; C.A. 239/92 Egged v. Mashiach
P.D. 48 (2) 66.
64 This is also the rationale to sec. 239(d) of the new 1999 Israeli Corporate Law. This section binds
publicly held corporations to nominate, among its outside directors, at least one man (if all other
directors are women) or at least one woman (if all other directors are men).
65 C. A. 1795/93, 1831/93, The Egged Pension Fund v. Yaakov P.D. 51 (5) 433.
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of contract law through the concept of trust.66 Respectively, the possible consumer
classification of asymmetrical contractual relations between the corporation and
its constituencies seems to substantiate the claim that contract law is used to
encourage an atmosphere of trust in the area of corporate law.

D. Trust as a Main Justification for the Securities Law
Finally, and even if not directly as part of the conventional contract law, we could
consider a recent trend in the Israeli Securities Law, which deals with giant and
publicly-traded corporations. The court’s opinion is justified mainly in regard to
the confidence of local and international investors in the Israeli capital market,67
and is evident in almost every section of the Securities Law. This is the case
concerning the liberal approach of the Israeli Supreme Court when applying the
disclosure requirements of the Securities Law,68 concerning the court’s liberal
approach toward the scope of the legal authority invested in the SEC and the
Stock Exchange, concerning its liberal attitude when approving class actions on
securities, and concerning its broad interpretation of criminal offences in the
securities code. This trend illustrates that the compulsory legal regime affecting
securities in contractual relations with corporations, through an impersonal and
diversified capital market, aims to reinforce a culture of trust, especially when
other market mechanisms fail in the attempt to foster such an atmosphere.69

66 See text to Supra note 32 and text to Infra notes 71-72.
67 See, for example, C. A. 218/96 Iskar Ltd. v. SEC (21/8/97, unpublished), at sec. 23. The same

rationale might also explain the 1991 Sec. 46b. amendment to the Israeli Securities Law, which
restricted dual-voting structure in publicly held corporations.
68 As noted in section A.3 , there is an obvious link between disclosure and trust.
69 In R.C.A. 4556/94 Tetset v. Zilbershatz P.D. 49 (5) 774, Chief Justice Barak implied this notion:
“Our economy differs from the American one, and our law differs from American law. Whatever the
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III. Initial Thoughts About Possibilities of Research in Corporate Law and
Securities Law Based on the Trust Theory of Contract Law
This article focuses on a claim that is relatively theoretical. Nevertheless, in this part I
consider some preliminary thoughts about selected issues in corporate law and
securities law that seem most appropriate for a research endeavor based on the trust
theory of contract and corporate law suggested above.
First, since contract and trust are basic, universal concepts, a trust theory of
contract and corporate law could supply comparative and descriptive explanations
consistent with the path dependence theory of corporate law,70 and based on the levels
of trust prevalent in each country. These explanations would address the issue of why
countries differ in their corporate governance structures, in their corporate law, and in
the level of protection granted to corporate constituencies.71 Trust theory will
hypothesize that, in low trust countries, corporate ownership structure was initially
developed in a way that exposed corporate constituencies to exploitation. Trust theory
will also hypothesize that these countries will have, or ought to have as a
complementary tool, more compulsory contract and corporate law, as well as stronger
legal protection for corporate constituencies.72 Second, and relying on the last

law in the United States, I… hold that in order to attain the aims of a class action suit, in Israel we
should also allow the sophisticated investor to file a class action suit.”
70 L. A. Bebchuk and M. J. Roe, Supra note 15; R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.
W. Vishny, Supra note 10.
71 Given that trust is also a behavioral attribute, we can draw a cross-cultural analogy between low and
high-trust countries on the one hand, and Kohlberg’s psychological model of individual moral
development on the other (see: H.A Michener & J.D. DeLamater Social Psychology (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Publishers, USA, 1994) at p. 73). Kohlberg’s model begins with moral judgments based on
external, physical consequences of acts, and proceeds to moral judgment based on social consequences
of acts, and moral judgments based on universal moral and ethical principles. Since this individual
progression through three levels of moral reasoning (each one involving two stages) is universal, and
depends, inter alia, on culture, this model can also be applied, collectively speaking, to a society.
72 It might be interesting to check the correlation between the thesis presented here and the
comparative findings presented in R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A, Shleifer Corporate
Ownership Around the World 54 J. of Finance (1999) 471-517; R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A,
Shleifer and R. Vishny Investor Protection and Corporate Governance 58 J. of Financial Economics
(2000) 3-27 ; S. Johnson, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer Tunneling 20 American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (2000) 22-27.
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argument, the concept of trust supplies normative criteria for determining, even in one
country, when corporate rules should or should not be mandatory,73 analogous to what
is known as “consumer legislation.” The hypotheses and the analogy assume that trust
also serves to explain the presence of compulsory consumer legislation in contract
law, which is generally perceived as enabling legislation. The growing might of
economic bodies and their alienation from more deprived constituencies as far as
information and economic resources are concerned explain the need for intervention
when a trust culture is lacking, since contracting might lead to abuses in these areas.
The principle of “let the buyer beware” is thus exchanged for one where the risk is
assumed by the seller, for the sake of preserving trust and fulfilling expectations in
contractual situations characterized by high incentives to breach them.74 This
argument supports, for instance, the much more pronounced tendency to rely on
mandatory rules for the regulation of public corporations characterized by dispersed
and passive investors than for their private counterparts. This is also true of other
issues involving the temptation to effect significant transfers between shareholders
and managers, or between minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder, or
issues that externalize risks in other constituencies.75 These actions encourage
breaches of trust and, therefore, should usually be subject to mandatory regulation.
The notion of trust can also help to justify the mandatory nature of the exception to
the limited liability principle in corporate law (the doctrine of “piercing the corporate
veil”) and anticipate when the court will implement it even in voluntary settings.

73 The issue of contractual freedom in corporate law is a fundamental issue in the theory and practice

of corporate law; the literature on this subject is thus very extensive, and it was also the theme of a
symposium issue in Columbia Law Review 89 (1989).
74 For a perception of modern corporate and securities law as part of consumer law, see E. Bukspan
About the Linkage of the Foundation Constituting Corporate Law, Consumer Law and Standard Form
Contracts 44 Hapraklit (1999) 314 (in Hebrew).
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Namely, personal liability will be imposed whenever corporate organs or
shareholders, which were involved in corporate contract or negotiation, have breached
the reasonable expectations they raised on the other party.76
Third, trust theory, as a comprehensive theory of contract and corporate law, can
shed more consistent light on the justification of full mandatory disclosure in the
securities law. Because disclosure is a crucial way of attaining trust, reducing risks
and providing incentives to cooperate, the need for disclosure requirements in
publicly traded corporations, characterized by investors’ diversification, inferiority,
and rational passivity, is easily explained.77
Fourth, the application of trust theory as a comprehensive theory of contract law
in the context of the multiple consent relationships prevalent among all corporate
actors could provide corporate managers with a coherent instrument for balancing the
reasonable expectations of all contractual constituencies associated with the
corporation. Moreover, the concept of trust can provide a consistent and holistic frame
for the contents of the well-known “Business Judgment Rule” without sacrificing the
shareholder supremacy goal of corporate law, because all other constituencies in a
typical corporation implicitly expect this rule and take it into account ex ante when
they enter the corporate scene. Since the supremacy goal of residual claimants’ (i.e.,

75 It is worth notify that my thesis supports an argument similar to that of Bebchuk, although on

different grounds (see: L.A. Bebchuk Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments 102 Harv. L. Rev. (1989) 1820).
76 As the Israeli experience demonstrates, one way of cementing an atmosphere of trust in the
corporate context is to ascribe personal contractual liability to corporate players vis-à-vis their
corporate constituencies. There are rare precedents for this liability in corporate law, in the doctrine of
“piercing of corporate veil.” As noted, trust theory could supply a coherent justification for such rulings
in the future.
77 Compare: L. Brandeis Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use it (1914) ch. 5 (“Publicity is
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman”). C. A. Williams The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency 112 Harv. L. Rev. (1999) 1197. Similarly, and as
shown in Part II, section D, the rhetoric of trust (protecting investors’ confidence in the capital market)
has been the prevalent legal justification in recent decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court concerning
issues settled in the 1968 Israeli Securities Law.
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shareholders), which is short for the goal of maximizing corporate value, is an
“existentialist” attribute required for the corporation’s survival, it affects the
reasonable expectations of the typical corporate voluntary constituencies.78 Balancing
the contracts of all corporate constituencies does not mean that enforcing one contract
will necessarily sacrifice the reasonable expectations of other constituencies, although
it may at times hurt their interests. Respectively, a legal regime that directs corporate
managers to maximize corporate value without neglecting their obligation to meet the
reasonable expectations of all corporate constituencies, might settle the purported
conflict surrounding the role of the corporation in the modern society (the “property
conception” of the firm v. its “social-entity conception”).79 It may also be more
effective in improving efficiency and strengthening the drive toward cooperation
among various constituencies than the traditional conception guiding managers to
concentrate only on the myopic interests of shareholders since the corporation, as an
organization based mostly on voluntary and contractual interactions, can reap
enormous benefits by relying on trust.80 In other words, the traditional agency
literature of corporate law, which views the shareholders as the main corporate
constituency, is unrefined and less than optimal, as it is not broad enough in
addressing the expectations of other corporate constituencies in particular, and the

78 Compare: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman The End of History for Corporate Law 89 Geo. L. J.

(2001) 439. The equation of the shareholders’ residual interest with the corporate value of profit
maximization led classic corporate literature to conclude that the most efficient allocation of voting
rights is to shareholders (in the one-share-one-vote scheme) and to analyze in its light the efficiency of
other corporate governance issues (F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (Harvard Univ. Press, 1991)).
79 Trust, then, will serve as a harmonic balancing tool between corporate constituencies, in a way that
will circumvent the so-called “schizophrenic conception” of corporate law; see: W. T. Allen Our
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation 14 Cardozo L. Rev. (1992) 261.
80 Paradoxically, a culture of trust that takes into consideration the reasonable expectations of
corporate constituencies might act as a bonding signal and prove most efficient for shareholders as
well. For an efficiency argument for trust relations between employees of a firm, see R. Chami and C.
Fullenkamp Trust and Efficiency (Oct. 1999) (SSRN, Electroniv Library). This paper is part of a larger
project on the role of trust in market organizations and the interaction of both market and non-market
organizations.
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basic idea of trust relations and commitment implicit in any contractual obligation in
general. In that sense, when we endorse the approach of the “nexus of contracts” to
corporate law, and the notion of trust toward all corporate players, we proceed along a
more holistic and integrative path regarding issues of corporate law, including the
goal of protecting investors in a global economy. In sum, the core of the typical
corporation, as a business microcosm, is concerned with the goal of maximizing
profits. This declared goal is the basic and most common expectation of a typical
corporation upon its formation, and is implicitly accepted by all corporate players.
Unlike the state or other public organizations, corporations are not usually subsidized
by public resources. Pure social and altruistic goals, therefore, failing to ensure
priority to the goal of profit maximization, will be ultimately self-destructive to the
corporation and all its constituencies, not only to the shareholders. The concept of
shareholder primacy reinforces this basic expectation from the corporation and its
organs, because shareholders are the residual claimants, and their most homogenous
interest is the only one that always correlates with the profit maximization goal of the
corporation.81 In this respect, the conclusion in Kraakman and Hansmann’s recent
work, The End of History for Corporate Law,82 appears plausible, namely, that the
shareholder primacy model of corporate law is today so undisputable that it represents
the “end of history” for corporate law.83

81 The survival and prosperity of the corporation are obviously in the best interest of all corporate

constituencies. In any event, most corporate constituencies at present are also residual claimants in
other corporations in their other capacities, such as investors in pension funds.
82 Kraakman and Hansmann, Supra note 78.
83 “[t] he basic law of corporate governance – indeed, most of corporate law – has achieved a high
degree of uniformity across these jurisdictions, and continuing convergence toward a single standard
model is likely…Chief among these pressures is the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered
ideology of corporate law among the business, government, and legal elites in key commercial
jurisdictions. There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value” (Id, p.1); “The triumph of the shareholderoriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured, even if it was
problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago” (Id., p. 32).
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Yet, the shareholder primacy model, even if it marks the “end of history” for
corporate law, is also the beginning of a new research path in corporate law. In some
sense, the shareholder primacy model is too narrow, even from the shareholders’ own
perspective, if it ignores the expectations of other corporate constituencies and their
willingness to optimize cooperation. For a long time, scholars of law and economics
focused on the shareholder primacy model and ignored the corporation’s interest in
preserving loyalty toward other constituencies, as if it these interests were mutually
exclusive. In contrast, a realm of trust, which is implemented in every contract,
implicitly binds the corporation and its organs not to thwart the reasonable
expectations of all other corporate constituencies. In the long run, implementing trust
in the interactions with shareholders and all other constituencies will serve everyone’s
best interests and, as a by-product, will be in the interest of residual claimants, saving
agency costs and inducing risk-taking and cooperation by all the constituencies
involved in the corporate community.84
Finally, the concept of trust, as a comprehensive theory of contract law and its
application to corporate contracts, is the best prescriptive theory of corporate law
because of its promising potential in helping to attain the long sought goals of
corporate law: internalizing an atmosphere of trust. This is the best atmosphere for
protecting investors and assisting them to maximize value by inducing corporate
constituencies to incur risks and cooperate. Because each contract constitutes the most
prevalent form of social and economic engagement, raising expectations, and inviting
mutual trust, it can be used to reinforce a culture of trust both locally and globally
when dealing with multinational corporations, with global contracts and with global

84 Compare: Manuel Beccerra and Anil K Gupta Trust within the Organization: Integrating the Trust

Literature with Agency Theory and Transaction Costs Economics 23 Public Administration
Quarterly (1999) 177-203.
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constituencies. Further research, which will be based on this view and will use
corporate contracts as a universal leverage for attaining trust, might supply promising
outcomes. An interesting point of departure could be the Israeli experience,85 which
makes, as shown, rather extensive use of the “good faith” doctrine of contract law in
corporate contractual constituencies, stressing their implicit obligation to fulfill the
reasonable expectations of all corporate players.86 Any breach of “good faith”
obligations by corporate organs, namely, any breach of the trust that was placed in
them, exposes them to financial damages that, in turn, and especially when involving
a stigma and expressive rhetoric, help to internalize loyal behavior and improve the
broader “business culture” of trust.

IV. Concluding Notes –The Interrelationship between Contract Law, Business
Corporation and Society
The fundamental characteristics of a business corporation, just like the most common
and trivial contract, are based on reciprocity and trade of future promises. Contractual

85 See Infra Part II.
86 Sec. 205 – “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement”. The comments to sec. 205 state:
a. Meanings of ‘good faith’… The phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness. The appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the
circumstances…
d. Good faith performance. Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes
further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than
honesty. A complete catalogue of all types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of
a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s
performance..” (Emphasis added – E.B.)
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attributes of this type, that are oriented toward future contingent actions and
cooperative behavior, immanently generate expectations and involve risk.87 The
business corporation, as a nexus of ongoing contracts which must be coordinated, thus
easily illustrates the nature of human being as a “social animal” “who can only satisfy
most of their needs by means of coordinated and cooperative activities” and as a
result, the significance of trust in this context.88
Contract law - which is justified by the concept of trust - is the legal device that
regulates this voluntary social and economical interaction. The linkage between the
attributes of the concept of trust as a social convention on the one hand, and contract
as a legal concept on the other hand, is that both are aiming to reach similar universal
goals of cooperation, risk- taking, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations.
Accordingly, and as “cultures grow up out of the countless small choices of millions
of people,”89 we can view specific contract in a given society not merely as “private”
and “micro” interaction, but rather as a subset of a broader social, macro, and cultural
aspects of common trust.
More significantly, if one can see the potential role of contract law, including its
“good faith” doctrine, as a compliance device serving to symbolize, build and
internalize a culture of trust in any routine interaction, so is the case especially in the
complex contractual interactions entailed by the corporate activity.

87 Remember that the “expectation” interest is the basic interest protected by contract law, see text to

Supra notes 28-31.
88 S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, Supra note 18.
89 J. Q. Wilson Human Remedies for Social Disorders 131 The Public Interest (1998) 25, 35.
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Since our daily lives are largely determined by the existence, activities, and
ideology of large corporations,90 the corporate phenomenon—as a community
reflecting a web of ongoing contracts—can serve a significant role in guiding society
toward a culture of trust. As the mere existence of corporations and their ability to
obtain capital and other resources are heavily dependent on the expectations they
generate in those who are asked to interact with them (e.g., shareholders, creditors,
employees, vendors, and customers), corporations have substantial incentives to
create expectations, together with a direct and utilitarian incentive to actually fulfill
them, thereby remaining attractive to the parties they transact with, and as a
consequence, ensuring their survival, growth, and profitability. The business
corporation, then, is a substantial social driver in our society, which creates and
fosters an atmosphere of trust and not only benefiting from it.
In a generation that is characterized by expansion and globalization of
corporations and investors, it is readily evident how these notions can be extended
across countries and cultures whereas the corporate entity would assume an active
role as a trust creator at the international level.91
In conclusion, it is evident that a culture of trust—as reinforced by any contract,
and even more so by a nexus of contracts—will not only contribute to the prosperity
of a specific transaction or an entity but also to the society as a whole.

90 See, for example the discussion in J.E. Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibilities – Issues

in the Theory of Company Law (Oxford University Press, 1993) Chapter 1.
91 The ambition to promote a culture of trust in the international trade can be found also in section 7(1)
to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) which
was signed in Vienna on April 11, 1980 (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance
of good faith in international trade” – emphasis added). Moreover, in the virtual age of e-commerce,
the crucial and universal significance of trust is more pronounced than ever before, compare: T.
..Frankel Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet 81 Boston University L. Rev. (2001) 457
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